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ABSTRACT: Tonneau attributes an antirealist position to my writing. In my reply I argue 
that my position is not antirealist, but a-ontological. I subsequently consider the 
implications of Tonneau’s core arguments in light of my a-ontological position and find 
that his claims do not apply to my work. Finally, I suggest an a-ontological approach to the 
realism controversy. 
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In his article Antirealist Arguments in Behavior Analysis, Tonneau (2005) 
claims that Barnes and Roche (1994, 1997) “have argued that the conceptual 
foundations of behavior analysis imply an antirealist view of the universe” (p. 55), 
but this antirealism exemplifies “logical confusions and [does] not derive from 
behavior analysis” (p. 56). In my reply I will first demonstrate that my position, 
which I now call Behavioral Pragmatism1 (Barnes-Holmes, 2000, 2004), is best 
characterized as a-ontological rather than antirealist. Subsequently, I will consider 
the implications of each of Tonneau’s core arguments in light of my a-ontological 
position and demonstrate, in each case, that his arguments do not apply to 
behavioral pragmatism. In closing, I suggest a behavioral pragmatist approach to 
the realism controversy. 
Not Antirealism But A-Ontological 
Antirealism comes in more than one variety, but in general it is characterized 
by an explicit opposition to the argument that scientific concepts or theories 
reflect, capture, refer, or correspond to an immutable, final, or absolute ontological 
reality. In providing a general description of antirealism, Bem and Looren de Jong 
(1997) suggest that at least two broad types may be discerned. The first grouping is 
composed of constructionists and relativists who deny that there is a reality 
independent of scientific theories and concepts; the second is composed of 
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instrumentalists who argue that scientific theories do not, in truth, mirror or 
correspond to reality, but are simply useful instruments for describing the world. 
When defined in this way, antirealism involves either denying a reality 
independent of scientific language or denying that scientific language corresponds 
to reality. In both cases the antirealist has something to say about the issue of 
ontological reality—either it does not exist independently of language or it does 
exist but language cannot capture it as it really is. The use of the term antirealism 
certainly seems appropriate here because both positions involve directly opposing 
the argument that scientific theories and concepts serve to mirror or capture an 
independent reality.  
In contrast to antirealism, the a-ontological position of behavioral pragmatism 
is simply silent on the issue of ontology. This a-ontological position is made 
possible when scientific truth is defined ultimately in terms of achieving specific 
goals, thus rendering ontological issues irrelevant. In effect, no fundamental, final, 
or absolute assumptions are ever made concerning the nature or substance of a 
behavior-independent reality, and thus there is no basis for making ontological or 
anti-ontological claims because the assumptions are not there to support them. This 
position is not antirealist (at least in the traditional sense outlined above) because 
realist arguments are not directly opposed, and neither is it realist because realism 
is not affirmed. In adopting the a-ontological position of behavioral pragmatism 
one simply walks away from the realism controversy, as a philosophical debate, 
and approaches the issue behavior-analytically (e.g., see Barnes & Roche, 1997, p. 
570). And as Tonneau himself points out, “a behavioral analysis of knowledge per 
se. . .is neutral with respect to the realism controversy” (p. 63).  
In response, Tonneau might argue that the statements he quoted from my 
work were clearly antirealist. Certainly, the quotations in his article, when taken 
out of context, seem to be antirealist (as defined above), but when appropriately 
contextualized this is not the case. Take, for example, the following statement: 
If we talk of a real, physical universe, we are saying that stimuli have some 
form of existence beyond our behavior; this clearly contradicts behavior-analytic 
epistemology, in which there can be no stimuli (i.e., a physical universe) if there 
is no organism to provide responses that define those stimuli. (Barnes & Roche, 
1994, p. 165) 
The latter half of the quotation is concerned with epistemology (assumptions about 
knowledge), not ontology (assumptions about reality), and thus no antirealist claim 
is implied, insofar as antirealism involves the explicit denial of, or lack of 
reference to, an ontological reality. Perhaps inserting “known,” as in “there can be 
no known stimuli” would have helped clarify the non-ontological basis of the 
claim, but in the wider context of the 1994 article this seems redundant. The 
distinction between ontology and epistemology was outlined at the beginning of 
the article, and moreover it is later suggested that comparing ontological and 
epistemological issues directly is inappropriate because ontology and epistemology 
are different domains, and thus direct comparison is a category mistake. The 
argument continues that the apparent contradiction between behavior-analytic 
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ontology and epistemology is better characterized as a paradox (i.e., contrary to 
expectation) because in other approaches ontology is consistent with epistemology. 
Finally, it is argued that treating the “contradiction” as a paradox may serve to 
transform a mechanistic ontology into a contextualistic ontology, which I will 
argue below is an a-ontological position. The critical point, however, is that in 
abstracting out a specific sentence from the article without placing it in its 
appropriate context, Tonneau incorrectly characterizes my position as 
unquestionably antirealist.  
Consider another quotation that Tonneau isolates as an apparent example of 
antirealism: “the fundamental nature of the universe (or reality) exists as a 
behavioral event” (Barnes & Roche, 1994, p. 167). On its own, this statement 
appears to make an ontological claim—that the only reality is behavior. At the end 
of the same section, however, a concluding caveat is provided:  
Finally, it is important to recognize that this form of contextualistic ontology is 
no more “true” or “final” than any other alternative. The truth of contextualistic 
ontology within behavior analysis will always depend upon the consequences 
arising from its use. In effect, contextualistic ontology is itself a behavioral 
interaction. Beyond this we can say no more. (p. 168) 
With this concluding statement, therefore, the sentence isolated by Tonneau, and 
indeed what is described as contextualistic ontology itself, are rendered  
a-ontological in that the truth-value of both are to be established behavior-
analytically (based on contingent consequences) and beyond this nothing more can 
be said (i.e., any talk of a fundamental, final, and absolute ontological reality is 
irrelevant).   
Perhaps the conceptual density of the 1994 publication, which was a short 
reply to a brief commentary on a target article, may have failed to make the 
foregoing a-ontological position absolutely clear to the reader. In subsequent 
articles, however, which Tonneau also cites, the a-ontological nature of my 
position is stated baldly and repeatedly. For example, when discussing the issue of 
truth in behavior analysis the following paragraph may be found in Barnes and 
Roche (1997): 
When confronted with the problem of truth in behavior analysis, the most 
typical response is to point out that we never attempt to construct a scientific 
analysis that corresponds to an extant, ontological reality. Instead, behavior 
analysis is concerned only with a pragmatic version of the truth. From this 
perspective, truth is defined simply in terms of prediction and control (i.e., 
successful working). If a scientific statement is useful in helping the behavioral 
scientist to achieve the goals of prediction and control, with some degree of 
scope and precision, the statement is considered true. . . .The correspondence 
between the scientific statement and an ontological reality is completely 
irrelevant. (p. 547, emphasis added) 
In this quotation the existence or non-existence of an ontological reality, or the 
ability or inability to refer to it, are not addressed. Rather, such issues are deemed 
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irrelevant. And in case the reader missed the point the following footnote was 
linked to this very paragraph: 
To define truth as “useful in achieving certain goals” is to define truth 
behaviorally (e.g., having a goal and trying to achieve it are behavioral events). 
The truth of a behavior-analytic statement must, therefore, be defined within a 
particular behavioral stream, and as such a truth statement is always inherently 
historical and context specific. From this perspective, ontology is simply 
irrelevant because the behavior analyst has no grounds on which to speak of 
hidden essences and underlying realities. That does not mean that ontological 
talk must be abandoned, however, because it may be useful at times to speak 
ontologically. With that caveat, the pragmatic behavior analyst takes the view 
that we cannot take ontological talk (or any talk) literally as it applies to an 
underlying philosophy of science or an underlying reality, because truth is just 
successful working—no more and no less. (p. 547) 
Once again, the existence of an ontological reality, or possible references to it, are 
neither affirmed nor denied—rather, they are treated as irrelevant because the 
behavioral-pragmatic approach to truth is not concerned with ontological issues 
(note, however, that ontological talk is permitted if it is deemed to be useful—I 
shall return to this issue subsequently).  
As one final example of the expression of my a-ontological position consider 
the following footnote that also appeared in Barnes and Roche (1997): 
When the behavior analyst utters a pragmatic truth statement. . .it may appear as 
if he or she is discriminating a correspondence between the statement and the 
event. However, if the behavior analyst is asked whether the statement does, in 
fact, reflect or correspond to the event he or she may simply reply; “I don’t 
know and I don’t care—I found making the statement useful, and that is all that 
matters.” (p. 561) 
The critical point here is that when asked about an ontological issue the reply is “I 
don’t know. . .” Ontological reality, or the possibility that one’s talk corresponds to 
that reality, is neither affirmed nor denied—ontology is simply irrelevant when 
truth is defined ultimately in terms of achieving specific pre-analytic goals. This is 
exactly the a-ontological position that I have adopted in my philosophical, 
experimental, and applied endeavors within the science of behavior analysis. And, 
as indicated previously, Tonneau seems to share my a-ontological view of the 
discipline when he writes: “a behavioral analysis of knowledge per se 
. . .is neutral with respect to the realism controversy” (p. 63).  
At this point one might reasonably ask why Tonneau described my position as 
antirealist rather than a-ontological. I am certainly willing to consider the 
possibility that my writing was unclear in making this distinction, and if so I hope 
that this reply clarifies matters. On balance, it should be noted that I have tended 
not to use the term “antirealism” to describe my position, but I have characterized 
my view as “a-ontological” (Barnes-Holmes, 2000, p. 199; 2003, p. 149). 
Similarly, I have deliberately used the term “nonrealist” (Barnes-Holmes, 2003, p. 
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146) to distinguish my position from antirealism. The former indicates not realist 
(i.e., a-ontological), whereas the latter indicates against or opposing realism. 
Nevertheless, perhaps Tonneau would argue that any position that is not realist is, 
ipso facto, antirealist (i.e., in the realism controversy one cannot be “agnostic”). If 
this is Tonneau’s view, then one can readily see why he characterized my position 
as antirealist.2 Be that as it may, it remains the case that Tonneau failed to present 
the a-ontological or agnostic character of my work with respect to the realism 
controversy, and thus I have attempted to correct this misrepresentation in the 
foregoing material. 
Implications for Tonneau’s Argument 
The critical point, as I now see it, is as follows. If we accept that behavioral 
pragmatism is not usefully characterized as antirealist (at least in the traditional 
sense) but a-ontological, what are the implications for the substance of Tonneau’s 
argument? In effect, does Tonneau’s refutation of antirealist conclusions in 
behavior analysis also apply to the a-ontological position I have described? To 
address this question I will now focus on the key points he raises in his article from 
the a-ontological position of behavioral pragmatism. 
Relations and Properties 
In distinguishing between relational and constitutive properties Tonneau 
appeals to philosophy, which may be useful at times, but he also admits that 
philosophers have differing views in this area and the relevant distinctions are not 
clear cut (pp. 57-58). In any case, for the behavioral pragmatist the explanatory 
mode of discourse is typically behavior-analytic, not philosophical—at least in the 
traditional sense (Barnes-Holmes, 2004). From the behavioral pragmatist 
perspective, making a distinction between relational and constitutive or intrinsic 
properties involves a complex set of discriminations that occur in the behavioral 
streams of scientists and philosophers who use those terms. Such complex 
discriminations may help behavior analysts to achieve their analytic goals, and 
indeed I have been involved in developing a behavioral theory of human language 
and cognition (Relational Frame Theory; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001) 
that draws heavily on broadly similar discriminations (i.e., the distinction between 
nonarbitrary and arbitrary stimulus relations). It remains the case, however, at least 
for behavioral pragmatism, that talking about constitutive properties is no more or 
less ontological than talking about relational properties. Such talk is approached 
behavior-analytically using technical concepts such as the “tact.” This analytic unit 
simply indicates a probabilistic correlation between a class of stimuli and a class of 
responses that was established by the contingencies prevailing in a verbal 
community (Skinner, 1957, p. 115). The tact, by definition, indicates nothing about 
                                                 
2 I would find it difficult, however, to square an argument against the possibility of an 
agnostic position with Tonneau’s statement that a behavioral analysis of knowledge is 
neutral with respect to the realism controversy. 
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the ontological existence or non-existence of stimuli and responses, or their 
bearers, in some behavior-independent domain.3 The same a-ontological status 
applies, of course, to all functional-analytic concepts in behavior analysis.  
But what of Tonneau’s example of John and his marital status? The tact 
“John” may continue to be reinforced by the verbal community when the tact 
“husband” is no longer reinforced with respect to John (i.e., following his divorce), 
but the longer survival value of a particular tact, relative to other tacts, has no 
ontological implications for the tacted stimulus or its bearer. Of course, one is free 
to argue that longer surviving tacts refer to constitutive properties and shorter ones 
refer to relations, but this conclusion is not derived directly from the concept of the 
tact per se. In any case, a behavioral pragmatist approach to such an argument 
would be to ask what purpose it serves, which might also involve subjecting the 
argument itself to a behavioral analysis. Such an approach, of course, is entirely 
consistent with the a-ontological character of behavioral pragmatism. 
 A Linguistic Confusion 
Tonneau argues that I have confused relational (or functional-analytic) 
properties with their bearers, or drawn the “fallacious inference that if an entity has 
some relational property then it does not have any physical property” (p. 60). This 
is not the case, however. As argued above, the a-ontological position of behavioral 
pragmatism argues neither for nor against an independent reality, and thus the 
existence or non-existence of behavior-independent physical properties is 
irrelevant. And even when ontological talk is employed, such as “the universe can 
only ever exist in behavior” (Barnes & Roche, 1994, p. 168), it carries no 
ontological weight because its truth-value is to be determined by its usefulness in 
achieving specific goals. In this case, the statement was part of a complex verbal 
stimulus (i.e., the entire article) that served to orient the reader toward a possible 
contradiction (or paradox) in making ontological claims when our science assumes 
that all knowledge is behavioral (note also that the immediately preceding context 
for the statement was focused on “talk about the universe,” not its ontology). The 
statement was not used, therefore, to deny, in some literal sense, the ontological 
existence of a nonbehavioral universe. Rather, it was used to highlight an example 
of verbal behavior within the discipline that might be deemed contradictory or 
paradoxical and to suggest a possible strategy for resolving the problem—the 
actual ontological existence or non-existence of a nonbehavioral reality was simply 
                                                 
3 Analyzing a particular tact relation may well involve employing scientific instruments to 
measure particular features of the tacted stimulus with some degree of precision, such as 
identifying the range of wavelengths that control the response “red” under certain 
conditions. Doing so, however, neither proves nor disproves the ontological, non-
behavioral existence of the color red in terms of specific wavelengths (or quale, or photons, 
or superstrings, etc.). Indeed, if proving or disproving the ontological existence of objects 
and events simply involved measuring the physical properties that control tacts, behavior 
analysis would be the ultimate science and philosophy.  
A-ONTOLOGICAL NOT ANTIREALIST 
 73
irrelevant to the argument. Once again, therefore, this is entirely consistent with 
the a-ontological approach of behavioral pragmatism.  
Physical and Functional Characterizations 
Tonneau suggests that the following sentence is problematic: “in behavior 
analysis, all events are known or defined in terms of behavioral functions, rather 
than as physical things that exist independently of behavior” (Barnes & Roche, 
1997, p. 545). Specifically, Tonneau argues that if “Barnes and Roche mean that 
behavior analysts do not or cannot characterize stimulus instances in physical 
terms, then the claim being made is false” (p. 60). Obviously, behavior analysts 
frequently speak and write as if their verbal responses refer to or correspond to an 
ontological reality. As argued previously, however, such talk is simply used by the 
behavioral pragmatist to serve the achievement of specific goals and thus no 
ontological weight is carried by such talk. I should also point out that if the realist 
controversy could be settled simply by pointing to the ubiquity of ontological talk 
there would be no controversy! But, of course, the relevant issues are not so simple 
(L. J. Hayes, 1993; see also Barnes-Holmes, 2000).4 
It is also important to note that the so-called problematic quotation starts with 
the phrase “in behavior analysis.” This phrase was used to highlight the technical 
or explanatory concepts of behavior analysis. Indeed, the example of the metal 
wedge that follows focused specifically on the use of such concepts, but Tonneau 
once again appears to have ignored the context of the quotation. In any case, the 
point is straightforward. A behavior analyst may well ask a colleague, for example, 
“Can you see it?” when adjusting the property of a stimulus that is to be used in an 
experiment, but in doing so the scientist is not explaining, in behavioral terms, the 
emission of the question itself. From a common-sense or mentalistic perspective, 
the use of the word “it,” for instance, may be explained in terms of an intentional 
act of reference, or verbal correspondence, to an ontologically real physical event 
(as in the example of the mental wedge that Tonneau describes). In contrast, a 
behavior-analytic description or explanation may employ concepts such as the tact 
or relational frame (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan, 2000) to 
characterize the functional relation between “it” and the stimulus. Functional 
relations, at least in behavior analysis, are correlational, and no mentalistic, 
cognitive, or intentional act of reference from the response to an ontologically real 
stimulus is implied when functional-analytic terms are used in a behavioral 
explanation. 
For the behavioral pragmatist, therefore, a technical analysis of ontological 
talk will be cast in terms of patterns of stimulus-response-stimulus interactions, not 
                                                 
4 The realism controversy is indeed complex, and a more complete reply to Tonneau’s 
article would involve working through many of the philosophical issues surrounding the 
concepts of reality and truth from a behavior-analytic perspective. However, much of this 
material has already been published (e.g., Barnes-Holmes, 2000; L. J. Hayes, 1993) and 
reworking it here would be largely redundant. I will leave it to the reader, therefore, to 
consult this earlier work in judging the value of Tonneau’s article (or, indeed, my reply). 
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semantic reference, literal meaning, or some form of word-referent 
correspondence. The procedural instruction “set the tone to between x and y cycles 
per second,” for example, could be interpreted as a relational network of derived 
stimulus relations (Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, & Dymond, 2001; Barnes-Holmes, 
O’Hora, et. al., 2001) or an instructional stimulus composed of tacts, intraverbals, 
relational autoclitics, and the like (Skinner, 1957), or perhaps a combination of 
both interpretations (Barnes-Holmes, et. al., 2000). In neither case, however, is 
semantic reference or literal correspondence to an ontological reality included as 
part of the explanatory nomenclature. The technical terms of behavior analysis are 
simply empty with respect to ontological reality, and thus neither realism nor 
antirealism is implied. 
It must be stressed, however, that the ontological emptiness of technical terms 
in behavior analysis does not preclude the use of ontological talk by a behavioral 
pragmatist. The writing of method and report sections in journal articles, and 
indeed much day-to-day scientific activity, involves using the common-sense 
language of cognitive reference, understanding, and so forth. The distinguishing 
feature of behavioral pragmatism is not the absence of ontological talk, which, as 
argued previously, is completely acceptable if it serves a particular goal. Rather, 
behavioral pragmatism is distinguished, in part, by its lack of concern with the 
fundamental nature of reality. For the behavioral pragmatist the goal of science is 
the construction of increasingly organized systems of verbal rules that allow 
analytic goals to be accomplished with precision, scope, and depth, and based on 
verifiable experience (S. C. Hayes, 1993). If the behavioral pragmatist is asked to 
comment on whether or not such verbal rules actually reflect, capture, or refer to a 
non-behavioral ontological reality, the scientist simply has nothing to say on the 
matter, except perhaps “addressing such a question takes me outside the purposes 
of my science.” 
Can Two Persons Know the Same Thing? 
In the Barnes and Roche (1997) article the example of two drivers reacting to 
the same red traffic light was considered, and because two distinct discriminative 
functions are involved it was suggested “in a sense, there are two red lights—one 
in each behavioral stream” (p. 546). Tonneau argues that this statement provides 
another example of confusing relational with constitutive properties. As should be 
clear by now, however, the statement was not ontological but a technical, 
behavior-analytic claim (hence the use of the phrase, in a sense). That is, there are 
two red lights in the sense that there are two separate discriminative functions. The 
ontological existence or non-existence of one or two red lights in the example is 
irrelevant to a technical behavior analysis. To appreciate the nature of this 
irrelevance, imagine that the entire universe and everything we supposedly know 
about it was shown to be a dream or highly advanced computer program (as 
portrayed in the Hollywood film series The Matrix). Provided that the dream or 
program continued as before, such a revelation would not diminish the established 
usefulness of the technical terms in behavior analysis. The concept of a 
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discriminative stimulus, for example, could still be used in exactly the same way in 
the dream or the Matrix even though common-sense assumptions about the 
fundamental nature of reality had been completely destroyed. It is in this sense that 
the technical nomenclature of behavior analysis is a-ontological.  
The Prisoner Variant 
Tonneau argues that no antirealist implications arise from the “assumption, 
uncontroversial among behavior analysts, that knowing is a behavioral 
phenomenon” (p. 62). Once again, I would agree with him, and in fact I made this 
argument in the very article that he cites (Barnes-Holmes, 2003). But Tonneau 
again fails to provide the wider context of the quotation that he uses to brand my 
position as antirealist. The relevant quotation concerns the argument that even 
behavior-analytic knowledge is behavioral (i.e., reflexive) and thus the behavior 
analyst has no grounds on which to make ontological claims; “not even the 
behavioral scientist can escape his or her behavioral stream and make direct 
nonbehavioral contact with an ontological reality” (Barnes-Holmes, 2003, p. 148). 
Although this statement could be interpreted as antirealist, a few lines later it is 
qualified: “On balance, stating that radical behaviorism is inherently reflexive also 
may be defined as a behavioral event, and thus any ontological claims with regard 
to its reflexivity can be seen as contradicting its own reflexivity. . . .A radical 
behaviorist solution to this conundrum involves embracing what I have called 
behavioral pragmatism” (pp. 148-149). Thus within a few lines of my apparently 
antirealist statement the a-ontological position of behavioral pragmatism is 
affirmed, which, as I have argued, is neither antirealist nor realist in character. 
Once again, therefore, Tonneau ignored a critically important qualifying statement, 
but I shall return to this issue subsequently. At this point I will turn to a second 
issue that arises in this section of his article.  
In discussing the behavioral nature of knowledge Tonneau argues as follows:  
We may know an object E by reacting to E with B, thereby knowing E itself 
without being locked in B. A behavioral conception of knowing (“I know E to 
the extent that I react to it”) is perfectly compatible with direct realism about E, 
and the world in general. True, in order to know my environment I must behave, 
but this does not imply that I know my behavior instead of the environment. (p. 
63) 
I found this statement problematic because it appears to introduce a mentalistic 
agent who comes to “know” stimuli or responses—I am assuming that E and B 
refer to these terms, respectively. As far as I am aware, however, the technical 
nomenclature of behavior analysis does not include a mentalistic entity or 
cognitive agent who engages in “knowing” about things, real or unreal. Indeed, 
knowledge claims in behavior analysis are interpreted as purely behavioral affairs. 
For example, the phrase “I know” in the statement “I know it is a red light” might 
be interpreted as a member of a qualifying autoclitic response class that is 
established and maintained by the consequences provided by the wider verbal 
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community (Skinner, 1957). In effect, the autoclitic is a purely functional concept 
and is not used scientifically to infer cognitive or mentalistic knowledge states 
about an ontological reality on behalf of the speaker. Needless to say, this 
approach to knowledge claims is entirely consistent with the a-ontological 
approach of behavioral pragmatism. 
As an aside, I was genuinely perplexed by Tonneau’s argument in this section 
of his article. As far as I can tell, it amounts to the claim that stimuli can be known 
directly (by reacting in some way) if we accept the existence of a knowing agent 
who knows stimuli directly. This argument is so far removed from my view of 
behavior analysis that I can only conclude that I have misunderstood in some way.  
Conclusion  
In the concluding section of his article Tonneau points out that his sole 
purpose was to refute the argument that antirealism follows “from any coherent 
practice or theory of behavior analysis” (p. 64). As I have shown, however, his 
arguments against antirealism do not apply to the a-ontological position that I have 
described. I suspect, however, that Tonneau will not be particularly satisfied with 
my response. Although he acknowledges the neutrality of the behavioral analysis 
of knowledge with respect to the realism controversy, he seems keen to push 
forward the “realist hypothesis” (p. 56) to the point of introducing the concept of a 
mentalistic agent who “knows” stimuli directly. I cannot help but conclude, 
therefore, that my characterization of behavioral pragmatism as a-ontological will 
not be enough for Tonneau. What he is really working towards is the promotion of 
realism, not neutrality. I will return to this issue in the next section.  
Epilogue 
In this final section I will point out yet another way in which Tonneau has 
misrepresented my work and I will then question the value of the current debate 
itself within the science of behavior analysis. 
Another Misrepresentation 
Tonneau tars me with the brush of philosophical absolutism when he 
attributes the following conclusion to me and other so called antirealists: “behavior 
analysis is, or must be, antirealist” (p. 56). Regardless of how one defines 
antirealism, I have never argued that behavior analysis is or must be anything. 
Although I have suggested that certain assumptions lead to certain conclusions, I 
do not believe that only those assumptions must be adopted. In fact, the  
a-ontological approach to behavior analysis that I have described in my work has 
always been offered as just one of a number of philosophical positions that might 
be adopted within the discipline. In the Barnes and Roche (1994) article, for 
example, four philosophical positions were examined and possible pros and cons 
of each were briefly considered. The article did not end with a final edict that 
demanded only one option be accepted. Similarly, the Barnes and Roche (1997) 
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article ended with the statement “In the current context, therefore, we find 
behavioral reflexivity to be a true and welcome feature of behavior analytic 
epistemology” (p. 570, emphasis added). In effect, the truth or value of the thesis 
was presented as contingent on a specific context and was not therefore a final or 
absolutist argument. Consider also that in the Barnes-Holmes (2000) article I 
wrote: 
We appear to have a choice, therefore, between living with the discomfort 
created by there being no absolute point to science, beyond that provided by our 
own goal statements, or living with the philosophical problems or verbal 
inconsistencies created by the assumption that scientific talk corresponds (at 
least potentially) to an external reality. (p. 200) 
Even if one disagrees with the nature of the choice, nonetheless a choice is clearly 
being offered. Finally, in a recent article I concluded: 
Although I have argued that the concept [of behavioral pragmatism] may be of 
some value in helping us to clarify our fundamental assumptions and facilitate 
and focus our discussions on the relevant issues within the science of behavior 
analysis, my rendition of behavioral pragmatism should be seen as simply 
another instance of verbal behavior that may or may not produce the desired 
outcome. (Barnes-Holmes, 2004, pp. 115-116) 
Once again, this statement is not a final edict on what behavior analysis is or must 
be, but instead offers one possible philosophical strategy that may or may not 
work.  
Given the foregoing statements, and indeed others that I could quote from my 
various articles, I was again left questioning Tonneau’s fundamental 
misinterpretation of my work—how could he get so much of it so wrong? As 
indicated previously, I suspect that Tonneau’s agenda was not simply to refute 
antirealist arguments within behavior analysis but to promote or protect realism 
within the discipline. And one way in which to do this is to burn a straw man of 
absolutist antirealism, thus leaving behind the putative default option—realism. In 
my view, however, I think that an open and clear proclamation of his realist 
position, and how it relates directly to the various traditions within behavior 
analysis, would be more worthwhile than chasing the white elephant of antirealism 
around the pages of Behavior and Philosophy. Naturally, if I am mistaken, and 
Tonneau is not seeking to promote realism within behavior analysis, I apologize 
unreservedly. But in any case I have some doubts about the value of the current 
debate itself, to which I will now turn. 
Are We Arguing Over the Shadow of an Ass? 
At this point, I suspect that the typical behavior-analytic reader may well be 
thinking that Tonneau and Barnes-Holmes are “arguing over the shadow of an 
ass.” And to be frank, I would have some sympathy with this view. A key purpose 
behind what I call behavioral pragmatism was to side-step the realism controversy 
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in behavior analysis, a controversy which seems to have raged both in philosophy 
and science for quite some time with no clear resolution in sight.  
The basic question that behavioral pragmatism poses is this—can a behavior 
analyst conduct his or her science simply by working toward the achievement of 
clearly stated, personal, pre-analytic scientific goals while remaining free of the 
conceptual and philosophical burdens of the realism controversy? Behavioral 
pragmatism does not answer this question for the individual behavior analyst—it 
simply suggests some possible choices and reasons why one choice might be 
preferred over another. 
What this approach offers, then, is the opportunity to avoid the well-worn 
philosophical debates in the realism controversy and to focus attention on the 
psychology of realism versus antirealism, which is where, I believe, behavior 
analysis and its concepts might be of some use. For example, what behavioral 
functions do the verbal networks we call realism and antirealism serve in 
philosophy and science? Do these networks affect the scientific behavior of 
practicing behavior analysts or are they largely verbal epiphenomena that serve 
only to distract, frustrate, or entertain? Does realism provide important motivative 
functions for some behavior analysts by endowing their scientific activities with 
“fundamental meaning”? And if so, why are antirealists and “agnostics” apparently 
motivated without such meaning?  
For me, addressing these and other related questions would be far more 
interesting than spending yet more time beside the philosophically stagnant pool of 
the realism controversy. And in a sense, this approach to the controversy—to study 
its impact in a specific behavioral domain—is a behavioral pragmatist solution to 
the controversy itself. Rather than affirming or denying ontological reality per se, 
the behavioral pragmatist side-steps the philosophical quagmire and chooses 
instead to subject the debate itself to a behavior analysis, thus providing a “living” 
example of the a-ontological strategy of behavioral pragmatism. 
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